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destroy the cause of his unpopularity; l. 10 refers to ll. 1-4: or else he must cease to wonder why women avoid him. Among the many instances of this use of the concluding distich by the Greek epigrammatists I may mention Callimachus *A.P.* ix. 566, and *A.P.* xii. 102.

In conclusion, does the interpretation of the epigram as given above throw any light on the missing word at the end of l. 9? We have seen that the purpose of the epigram is to praise the *single* poem "Smyrna" of Cinna by contrasting it with voluminous and carelessly written works *in general*. We must expect, then, in this line some word which will indicate Cinna in a very personal and unequivocal manner. We do not, therefore, want the name of some Greek poet, as Munro insists. I know of nothing better than *sodalis*, the generally accepted emendation.

Possibly the external arguments do not admit of quite so good a case for "Hortensius." The chief objection is that Q. Hortensius Hortalus (for all seem agreed that the Hortensius here alluded to must be the great orator) was a writer of erotic poetry, and sympathized with the same tendencies as Catullus. Without entering into a discussion of this, I will merely mention that fact which, as far as I know, all editors save Ellis seem to ignore, viz., that Hortensius wrote "Annales" (*Vell. Paterc.* ii. 16: "Q. Hortensius in Annalibus suis rettulit"). To be sure, we do not know that these "Annales" were in verse. Must we assume, however, that the Hortensius to whom Catullus alludes is the orator? The name must have been a common one in Rome. Might this not be some obscure poetaster, whose very name would early have passed into oblivion but for this chance mention by Catullus?

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EMENDATION OF MAXIMUS OF TYRE XVII.8

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐνταῦθα διφνῇ ὁρῶ· τοῦ γὰρ νοῦ ὁ μὲν νοεῖν πέφυκεν, καὶ μὴ νοῶν· ὁ δὲ καὶ πέφυκε, καὶ νοεῖ.

Instead of διφνῇ we should probably read διπλόην ὁρῶ (cf. Plato *Sophist* 267E), "I see a crack or a line of cleavage for a logical διαίρεσις," or possibly διαφνὴν (Plato *Politicus* 259D), which involves less change. The greater aptness in the context of the noun in itself makes the emendation plausible. But there is much more to be said for it. Throughout the chapter Maximus is imitating the Platonic method of dichotomy illustrated in the *Sophist* and *Politicus*. This has seemingly escaped the notice of Hobein, *De Maximo Tyrio quaestiones*, pp. 51-52, but is apparent from the vocabulary as well as from the actual procedure of division. διαιρούμενος . . . δῆχα [cf. Plato *Sophist* 221E and *passim*]
—τὴν ἑτέραν τὴν τιμιωτέραν
τέμνων αἰὲ [cf. *Sophist* 235C] ἐστ' ἂν ἐφίκηται τοῦ νῦν ζητουμένου [cf. *Phaedrus*

266A. *πάλιν τοῦτο τέμνων οὐκ ἐπανῆκεν πρὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐφευρών*, etc.]-*τῶν ὄντων τοίνυν τὰ μὲν . . . τὰ δὲ*, etc. This imitation of Platonic dichotomy was a favorite device of later philosophers and rhetoricians who desired to display their learning. And the employment of the Platonic gloss *διπλόη* (*Sophist* 267E) in this connection became almost a fixed convention. In the Platonic passage too it is used with a verb of seeing and followed up with a *γὰρ* clause with *μὲν* and *δὲ*. Aristotle himself does not employ the word. But Platonizing Aristotelian commentators often use it to introduce Aristotelian distinctions. The lexicons do not bring out these facts. The following examples, some of them supplied by my pupil Dr. Misener, are by no means exhaustive, but are sufficient I think to raise a presumption. It may be observed in confirmation of our conjecture (1) that modern editors have found it necessary to restore the word elsewhere, e.g., in Plutarch; (2) that it is used with special frequency to distinguish parts or aspects of the soul.

Plutarch *De virtute morali* 441D: *τὴν γὰρ ἑτέραν διπλόην οὐ κατείδον, ἀλλὰ τὴν ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος μῖξιν ἐμφανεστέραν οὖσαν*. *ὅτι δ' αὐτῆς ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἑαυτῇ συνθετόν τι καὶ διφνὲς καὶ ἀνόμοιον*, etc. Here there is the same progress as in Maximus from the distinction of soul and body to distinctions within the soul. I quote Plutarch's use of *διφνὲς* here in order to deal fairly with the reader. But its occurrence with other synonyms in a different construction does not appreciably weaken the argument for *διπλόη* as the key-word, supported as it is by the cumulative evidence of other examples. Our purpose does not require a discussion here of the possible relations between Plutarch, Galen, and Posidonius, for which see von Arnim, *Stoicorum Fragmenta*, I, xvi.

In Plutarch's *Pericles* 158B, Ruhnken suggests *διπλόη* for *διαπλοκή*. And in *Quaest. conviv.* vii. 10. 715F *διπλόας* is evidently to be preferred to *διπλοῦς*. Cf. also *De communibus notitiis* 1083C. The word is a special favorite of the Aristotelian commentators: Themistius on Ar. *De an.* 412A, 22-28: *καὶ ταύτην οὖν ἐστὶν εὐρεῖν ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν διπλόην*, and in several other passages; Simplicius on *De an.* 430A, 23: *καὶ γὰρ καὶ παρ' ἐκείνῳ διπλόην τινὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐμφαίνει τὸ αὐτοκίνητον*; Ammonius on Ar. *De interpretatione* 16A, 1: *ὅταν δὲ διπλόην τινα . . . θεασάμενοι . . . διαιρούμεν αὐτάς*, etc.; Syrianus on Ar. *Met.* 1001A, 29: *οὐδεμίαν διπλόην οὐδὲ ἔμφασιν πλήθους ἔχοντος ἐν ἑαυτῷ*. These instances, which could easily be multiplied, suffice to establish the probability that Maximus, who is steeped in Platonic reminiscences, in a passage where he is obviously imitating the Platonic *διαίρεσις*, and applying it like the Aristotelian commentators to the soul, used the noun *διπλόη*, which is almost normal in such a connection, rather than the adjective *διφνῆ*, which can hardly be construed in the context, and which might easily have been substituted by an ignorant scribe.